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Extra-Legislative Tort Liability for
Discrimination
T HE QUEST for adequate remedies to overcome discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin has
induced several state legislatures in recent years to enact laws creat-
ing state antidiscrimination commissions.1 Experience had demon-
strated that existing federal and state antidiscrimination laws could
not adequately protect the rights of an aggrieved party. Federal
laws were restrictive as to jurisdiction,' and the state courts tended to
construe statutory remedies as exclusive, frequently failing to deter
discriminatory practices or afford victims adequate relief.' Further-
more, under the older civil rights statutes, discrimination was gen-
erally unlawful only in cases involving public accommodations.4
Depending upon the purpose and type of the particular statute, the
more recent administrative remedies are designed to give more ade-
quate relief against discrimination and, in addition, to extend this re-
1 The following state statutes provide for some form of administrative enforcement
of antidiscrimination laws: ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.190-.235 (1962); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1401 to -1485 (Supp. 1966); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1420-32; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-1 to -8 (employment), §5 25-3-1 to -6 (1963) (public ac-
commodations); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-122 to -128 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, §5 710-13 (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1963);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2307 to -2328 (repl. vol. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 105A.1-
.12 (Supp. 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. §5 44-1001 to -1013 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 11-12, 14, 16-20 (Supp. 1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
55 1-10 (1958); MIcH. STAT. ANN. 5§ 17.458(1)-(11) (1960); MANN. STAT. ANN.
5 363.01-.13 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 314.101-.080 (Supp. 1965); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to :14 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1 to -28
(Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-4-1 to -14 (1953); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §5
290-301; OHIO REV. CODE §5 4112.01-.99; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 951-54
(1961); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-.115 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §5 951-63
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §5 28-5-1 to -39 (employment), 55 11-24-1 to -8
(1956) (public accommodations); UTAH CODE ANN. 55 34-17-1 to -8 (1966);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 55 49.60.010-.320 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. 55 111.31-.36
(1957).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d
855 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965); Fletcher
v. Coney Island, Inc., 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956). See generally Goos-
tree, The Iowa Civil Rights Statute: A Problem of Enforcement, 37 IOWA L. REv. 242
(1952); Van Alstyne, A Critique of the Ohio Public Accommodations Law, 22 OHnO
ST. L.J. 201 (1961); Comment, Public Accommodations: Remedies for Denials of Equal
Treatment, 7 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 88 (1962).
4 The first state statutes prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tions were enacted shortly after the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 18 Star. 335, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a history of early
civil rights legislation, see Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L.
REV. 547 (1909).
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lief to employment and housing as well as public accommodations.5
The commissions are able to provide more adequate relief because
they are generally given the authority to issue an order requiring
the business establishment to cease and desist from any unlawful
discriminatory practice and to take such further affirmative measures
as will effectuate the purpose of the legislation.'
Noticeably, the administrative remedies are not designed to com-
pensate the aggrieved party in money damages except where there is
a provision which authorizes the commission to direct the payment
of back pay in cases of employment discrimination.' In such cases,
the commission orders the employer to pay the complainant the
amount he would have earned in the absence of the unlawful dis-
criminatory practice, with an allowance for interim earnings he may
have acquired elsewhere. Perhaps in creating administrative reme-
dies the legislatures thought that adequate legal remedies were al-
ready available to the individual under the public accommodations
statutes or at common law. It is unfortunate to find, however, that
although these statutes often provide for some sort of civil remedy to
the aggrieved party, by and large they have been unsuccessful in
their result.' Moreover, the courts have failed to find a means for
redressing the aggrieved party since they have allowed tort law to
lie dormant in discrimination cases.'
There are several reasons for finding only a small number of
cases in which compensatory damages were awarded for discrimina-
5 The commissions originally dealt only with employment, but state legislatures
later extended their jurisdiction to include housing and public accommodations. The
New York fair employment law of 1945 created the first state antidiscrimination com-
mission. N.Y. EXECtrrsVB LAw §§ 293-95. Modeled in large part after the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964), the
statute established an agency with procedures much like those of the National Labor Re-
lations Board by assigning to it the function of enforcing the state's policy against dis-
crimination in employment. For a complete discussion of state antidiscrimination
commissions, see Dyson & Dyson, Commission Enforcement of State Laws Against Dis-
crimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Kansas Act, 14 KAN. L. REV. 29 (1965);
Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526 (1961).
8 See, e.g., OsnO REv. CODE § 4112.05(G).
7Ibid. The back pay award is copied from the language in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) which provides back pay as a remedy for persons unlawfully
fired for union activity. 49 Star. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(C) (1964).
Although the NLRA permitted back pay relief only in situations involving reinstatement
of employees previously hired, most states have enabled their commissions to award back
pay for a discriminatory refusal to hire. Only Kansas and Missouri limit back pay
awards to situations involving reinstatement of employees fired because of discrimina-
tion. Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 323, 5 5; Mo. REV. STAT. § 296.040(G) (Supp. 1961).
8 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
9 See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1961).
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tion. First, individuals are often hesitant to utilize civil remedies
provided by statutes because of the expense and effort of a lawsuit
and because Negroes are aware that their claims will probably be
decided by a white judge and jury. Second, the difficulty inherent
in calculating damages makes it likely that any recovery would be
minimal. Finally, the inadequacy of the remedy for one whose pri-
mary interest is in finding a better home or job has discouraged
litigation.
The antidiscrimination commissions have been successful in de-
terring discriminatory practices in that they have been more effec-
tive than any of the previous statutory remedies in compelling viola-
tors to comply with the law.' However, administrative relief does
not necessarily make the aggrieved party whole, because there are
no means available to compensate him for his injuries or financial
losses. The violator is, in effect, permitted his "first bite free."
This Note will explore the possible justification for utilizing the
recently enacted state antidiscrimination statutes creating administra-
tive relief as a basis for a tort action by the aggrieved party to re-
cover compensatory damages. The term compensatory damages is
used in a broad context to include actual "out-of-pocket" expenses,
loss of human dignity, humiliation, and mental anguish. This rem-
edy would be in addition to the relief provided by the commissions.
Because such statutes have dearly made discrimination a wrong, the
injured party should have a remedy to compensate him for his eco-
nomic loss as well as to punish the violator. The fact that other
remedies are available under existing antidiscrimination laws need
not mean that such forms of relief are exclusive.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PROVING DAMAGES
Before a tort action can be brought for compensatory damages,
there must be some injury on which the plaintiff can base his plea
for relief. 1 It is not surprising that in discrimination cases most
people think that an aggrieved party does not suffer any injuries
which should be compensated in damages because such unlawful
conduct usually does not result in any physical harm or direct finan-
cial loss. 2 However, this should not prevent the courts from recog-
10 See Dyson & Dyson, supra note 5, at 57; Van Alstyne, Civil Rights: A New
Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 683 (1961); Note, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 526 (1959).
11 PROSSER, TORTS §§ 1-2 (3d ed. 1964).
12 Certainly there should be a sound basis for a tort remedy by an aggrieved party
where discriminatory conduct causes physical harm.
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nizing that there should be recovery for the humiliation, loss of hu-
man dignity, and mental anguish caused by the discriminating party.
The courts might also award additional relief in the form of exem-
plary or punitive damages to reimburse the aggrieved party for ele-
ments of damages which are not legally compensable, such as
wounded feelings or the expenses of suit.
A. Damages for Mental Distress
Although most courts have thus far failed to acknowledge men-
tal distress as a compensable injury,"3 there is sound reason for al-
lowing damages for this type of injury when it is caused by the
intentional conduct of one who unlawfully discriminates against an-
other on the basis of race or religion.1" An examination of existing
tort law reveals that damages for mental distress generally are not
recoverable unless the mental injury is accompanied by some physi-
cal injury or by some already recognized tort.' However, there are
exceptions to this rule, and mental distress may be a cause of action
in itself where it results from conduct which is so outrageous that it
causes severe emotional distress." In addition, the intentional in-
fliction of mental suffering has been recognized as a separate cause
of action in cases involving wrongful eviction,'" insult by public
carriers' and innkeepers,"' and abuse of dead bodies.2"
An act of discrimination is seldom hostile and usually does not
cause severe emotional distress. For this reason, it is unlikely that
discrimination cases would be included in the first exception which
permits recovery for mental suffering in the absence of physical in-
juries. But the inclusion of cases involving unlawful discriminatory
conduct in the class of cases recognizing the intentional infliction of
mental suffering as a separate cause of action would seem to be a
1 In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), the
court found that the defendant's discriminatory conduct warranted only one hundred
dollars in damages because it did not cause severe emotional distress. But see Anderson
v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921), where the court held
that the defendant's refusal to admit a Negro to his theatre constituted a tort for which
the plaintiff's consequential mental suffering was an element of actual damages.
14 For a complete discussion of the problem of proving damages for mental suffer-
ing in discrimination cases, see Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discrimination
Cases, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. RBV. 1 (1966).
15 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 11.
16 Ibid. See also Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956).
17Hargrove v. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 273 Pac. 298 (1928).
18 Knoxville Traction Co. v. lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
1 Emmke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923).
2
-England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920).
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logical extension of existing tort law. The cases in the second
exception involving wrongful eviction, insult by public carriers and
innkeepers, and abuse of dead bodies are similar to discrimination
cases in that the injuries arise from intentional conduct or malice
which disregards the legal rights of another.
Arguments that damages for discriminatory conduct cannot be
measured seem to have no more validity in discrimination cases than
in the class of cases presently recognizing that mental distress is
compensable. For example, the mental suffering experienced by an
evicted tenant seems no less difficult to prove than that experienced
by a Negro who is refused admission to a place of public accommo-
dation. The degree to which the jury is outraged by such unlawful
conduct should be reflected in the amount of their damage awards.2 '
B. Punitive Damages
Where a defendant's wrongdoing is intentional and has the
character of outrage frequently associated with crime, most courts
have permitted the jury to award the plaintiff punitive or exemplary
damages.22 Such damages are given to the plaintiff over and above
the compensatory damages for his injuries in order to punish the de-
fendant and deter others from committing such acts.2" Punitive
damages might also serve the additional purpose of reimbursing
the plaintiff for injuries which are not otherwise compensable, such
as his wounded feelings or expenses of litigation.
Since discrimination is caused by an intentional act in disregard
of the legal rights of another, the courts would seem to be justified
in allowing an award of punitive damages to the aggrieved party.
Thus, where antidiscrimination laws fail to provide adequate reme-
dies to punish the discriminating party, an award of punitive dam-
ages would serve the dual purpose of discouraging future discrimina-
tory conduct as well as compensating the plaintiff for the expenses
of bringing the tort action where his actual damages are not sizeable.
The fact that existing legislation recognizes discrimination as unlaw-
ful indicates the outrageous character of such conduct to the com-
munity.
2 1 For a thorough analysis of the legal basis for awarding a victim of discrimination
damages for mental suffering, see Duda, supra note 14.
22 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 2.
23 Ibid.
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HI. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AS A BASIS FOR A
CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
A. Public Accommodations Statutes as a Basis for a Separate Tort
Action
The idea of allowing antidiscrimination legislation to act as a
basis for supporting a separate tort action on behalf of the protected
party is not new. A few courts have permitted a civil action for
damages to be based on the older public accommodations laws. In
Browning v. Slenderella Systems,"4 the court classified discrimina-
tion as an outrageous act in order to allow compensatory damages
for mental distress. 5 Although the trial court awarded 750 dollars
in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, the amount was reduced
to one hundred dollars on appeal. The appellate court stated that
substantial damages were not justified because the defendant's con-
duct did not cause severe emotional distress and merely warranted a
nominal recovery for mental suffering.26
Some courts have adopted a more realistic approach to the
difficulty of proving compensatory damages by granting punitive or
exemplary damages." Interestingly, the issue of damages is some-
times never reached because the court may be concerned only with
whether or not there is a cause of action. 8 Once a cause of action is
established, these cases are likely to be disposed of by out-of-court
settlements.
In Amos v. Prom, Inc.,29 for example, the court never decided
the merits of the case. The plaintiff brought an action in a federal
district court seeking three thousand dollars compensatory and seven
thousand dollars exemplary damages for the defendant's violation of
the Iowa Civil Rights Statute.3" Iowa law permits an award of
exemplary damages where the defendant, without justification, in-
tentionally commits an illegal act which results in an injury to the
24 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
2 5 Id. at 446, 341 P.2d at 863.
26 Ibid.
27 See, e.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
28 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956);
Washington v. Blampin, 226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964); Bachrach v.
1001 Tenants Corp., 41 Misc 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1963), rev'd, 21 App. Div.
2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 NE.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.
2d 929 (1965).
29 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
30 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 105A.1-.12 (Supp. 1965).
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plaintiff."' The defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that under Iowa law it would be legally
impossible for the plaintiff to recover damages in an amount exceed-
ing the federal jurisdictional minimum." The court found that
compensatory damages might be recovered for the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress and that the defendant's malicious conduct would also
support an award for exemplary damages."3 Since it did not appear
to be a legal certainty that a recovery in excess of three thousand
dollars would be impossible under Iowa law, the motion to dismiss
was overruled. 4
B. Administrative Remedy as a Basis for a Separate Tort Action
In Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp.,5 a cooperative apartment
corporation refused to sell stock and a proprietary lease to the plain-
tiff because he was Jewish. The plaintiff brought an action for
compensatory damages, alleging that the defendant's conduct was
unlawful and in violation of the Administrative Code of New York
City. 6 The trial court held that the complaint sounded in prima
facie tort and accordingly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The court stated that the key to prima facie tort is the infliction,
without excuse or justification, of intentional harm which results in
damages." Because the defendant's conduct was contrary to the
law of the city and the state, the plaintiff should have been per-
mitted to recover damages based upon the difference in value of
other obtainable accommodations he may have found. Although
the New York City Code did not expressly provide a civil remedy
for damages, the court reasoned that such an omission was inten-
tional so that a limitation could not be implied. However, on ap-
peal 8 the case was reversed on the ground that the absence of pri-
vate or individual remedies in the code indicated that the intention
of the legislature was to exclude such remedies. 9 According to the
3' 115 F. Supp. at 134.
3 2 The jurisdictional amount at that time was three thousand dollars. 36 Stat. 1091
(1911).
83 115 F. Supp. at 137.
34 Ibid.
2541 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1963), rev'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 662, 249
N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), a4'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965).
36NEw YoRx, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, §§ D1-1 to -4.
3741 Misc. 2d at 515, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
3821 App. Div. 2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), aft'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205
N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965).
39 Id. at 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
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appellate court, the express intent of the legislature would have to
be shown in order to establish an action for damages on such a
basis.40
The opinion of the trial court in Bachrach illustrates a novel
approach of establishing a basis for a recovery of damages in a pri-
vate tort action. If discrimination is made unlawful by legislative
enactment, anyone who violates that law acts illegally and inflicts
an intentional harm which sounds in tort. It is true that an admin-
istrative agency will eventually issue a cease and desist order after a
complaint is made and a violation established. However, this re-
lief may be too late for the complainant who has already suffered
financial losses in seeking comparable accommodations, not to men-
tion the humiliation and mental anguish experienced. Such dam-
ages should not go unnoticed by the courts merely because the
legislature made no express provisions for a civil action in damages.
In a separate tort action brought by the aggrieved party, the
courts need not be concerned that the remedies provided by statutes
which make discriminatory conduct unlawful are exclusive. By
making discrimination unlawful, legislative enactments serve to cre-
ate a standard of conduct. The extension of existing tort doctrines
based upon the legislation make a violation of the statute a prima
fade tort. 1  The court does not look to the statute for remedies;
rather it looks to it to determine whether the prescribed standard of
conduct has been met. Thus, the court does not usurp the function
of the legislature by this act of interpretation.
C. Authority of Antidiscrimination Commissions
To Grant Compensatory Damages
Most antidiscrimination commissions now have the authority to
compensate a complainant by ordering back-pay awards, but it is
questionable whether they can order the payment of other dam-
ages.42 For example, in Ohio the statutory provisions appear to
restrict the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to back-pay awards," a
power which has been invoked in at least six instances in awards
ranging from two hundred dollars to over two thousand dollars.44
40 Id. at 663, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
41 See, e.g., Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
42 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
4 8 Ono REV. CODE § 4112.05(G).
44 Interview with Ellis L. Ross, Executive Director, Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
in Cleveland, Ohio, March 17, 1966.
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There is only one known case, Rose Hill Sec. Co.,45 in which the
Ohio Commission ordered the payment of actual damages. In
that case a Negro woman attempted to purchase for her deceased
grandmother a burial plot in a local cemetery, but her offer was re-
fused on the ground that the cemetery was reserved for white
persons. When a complaint was filed with the Commission in
accordance with the Ohio antidiscrimination statute,46 the decedent's
body was placed in a temporary vault so as to preclude mootness4
Upon completion of the administrative proceedings, the cemetery
company was ordered to cease and desist from discriminatory prac-
tices in the public sectors of the cemetery and to grant burial rights
for the complainant's grandmother. In addition, the Commission
ordered Rose Hill to reimburse the granddaughter for the expenses
incurred as a consequence of the discrimination.48 Damages were
restricted to tomb rental fees, and no compensation was awarded
for mental suffering. " Such injuries might also have been com-
pensable in view of existing tort law in cases dealing with dead
bodies.5° It is arguable that the Ohio courts would not agree that
the Commission had the authority to order the payment of any dam-
ages, but this point cannot be authoritatively determined because the
respondent complied with the order without resorting to judicial
review.5
1
Granting antidiscrimination commissions the authority to order
a payment of compensatory damages after the completion of the
administrative proceedings would be an efficient method of giving
complete relief to the aggrieved party. It is certainly more direct
than a separate civil action in the courts. The commission could
easily adjudicate the additional issue of damages while the case is
before it, sparing the parties the time and expense of additional liti-
gation. Moreover, the amount of damages would be determined by
experts who are more familiar with discrimination problems than
458 RACE REL. L. REP. 749 (1964).
4 6 0 1-o REV. CODE § 4112.01-.99.
47A barber's refusal to cut a Negro's hair was found to be discriminatory under
Ohio law by an Ohio court. Gegner v. Graham, 1 Ohio App. 2d 442, 205 N.E.2d 69
(1964). But later the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot 1 Ohio St. 2d
108, 205 N.E.2d 72 (1965).
48 8 RACE REL. L. REP. at 760.
49 Ibid.
50 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 11.
5 1 Most antidiscrimination statutes provide that the commissions' orders are review-
able in a court proceeding. E.g., OHiO REV. CODE § 4112.06; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 960 (1964).
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are judges and juries. State civil rights commissions are comprised
of a select group of appointed officials, most commonly attorneys,
who are prominent in the civil rights field. These officials have a
better understanding of discrimination problems because they spend
most of their time enforcing antidiscrimination laws.
While damage awards granted by antidiscrimination commis-
sions would probably be subject to judicial review,52 the overall
effect would be to insure complete relief for every aggrieved party
as part of the initial administrative proceedings. Subsequent re-
view by the courts would operate to make the amount of damage
awards conform to existing community standards. However, in the
absence of express legislative authority to grant such relief, admin-
istrative agencies might soon be discouraged by the courts from
awarding damages. For this reason, it is the duty of the courts to
recognize a private civil action designed to compensate the com-
plainant. Such an action could be brought as an intentional tort in
order to prevent possible invalidation of the action by existing state
statutes on the ground that the statutory remedies are exclusive.
III. ARE EXISTING STATUTORY REMEDIES EXCLUSIVE?
Before the inception of antidiscrimination commissions, the ag-
grieved party's sole remedy was under the public accommodation
statutes.5" This proved to be highly unsatisfactory because the
courts were reluctant to recognize an action for damages or equitable
relief unless it had been authorized by the statute or ordinance. 4
These laws were basically penal, imposing minimum and maximum
amounts payable as a criminal penalty or in a civil action to the
aggrieved party.55 Such remedies were insufficient to act as a de-
terrent to discrimination, because the violator could pay the fine,
which was generally an insubstantial amount, and continue to
thwart the true discrimination-preventative purpose of the public
accommodations laws. Imposition of higher minimum penalties
might help deter violations of the public accommodations laws, but
52 Ibid.
5 3 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
54 The view taken was that unless the specific cause of action is granted in the
statute none is created, since this type of legislation is in derogation of the common law
which provided no redress. Tynes v. Gogos, 144 A.2d 412, (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1958); White v. Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (1918); Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co.,
218 Ind. 513, 34 N.E.2d 17 (1941); Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W.
231 (1909).
5 5 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 2901.35 provides for either a criminal or civil remedy
for damages of fifty to five hundred dollars.
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this would not prevent discrimination in housing and employment
nor would it necessarily compensate the aggrieved party for all his
injuries, including mental distress.
A better approach has been taken by a few courts which have
liberally construed state statutes to provide more effective relief by
recognizing remedies not specifically enumerated in the statute.56
An examination of the common law cases will facilitate an under-
standing of the rationales supporting strict and liberal construction.
A. Strict Construction of Statutes
The difficulty in persuading today's courts to recognize a civil
action for compensatory damages supported by antidiscrimination
laws stems from the narrow interpretation given to public accom-
modation statutes.5" Where the statute permitted a civil remedy for
damages, the maximum recovery was limited to the statutory
amount. The courts frequently refused equitable relief, basing their
decisions both upon strict statutory construction and upon generali-
zations that equity will not enforce the criminal law or personal
rights.5
8
An excellent example of the narrow construction a public ac-
commodations law can be given is the decision in Fletcher v. Coney
Island, Inc.59 In that case, a Negro woman sought to enjoin the
owner of an amusement park from refusing her admittance. De-
spite the plaintiff's plea that the remedy at law was inadequate, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that she was restricted to the statutory
remedies provided for such a violation 0 and refused the injunction. 1
The court stated that the statute created new rights and prescribed
remedies and penalties for their violation and that therefore an addi-
tional remedy by injunction was not contemplated by the legislature
and could not be invoked by the court."
56 Stone v. Pasadena, 47 Cal. App. 2d 749, 118 P.2d 866 (1941); Bolden v. Grand
Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Randall v. Cowlitz
Amusements, Inc., 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d 1017 (1938); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre
Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
57 See note 54 supra.
58See Comment, 7 ST. LOUIs U.L.J. 88, 94 (1962).
59 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
60 OHio REV. CODE § 2901.35, provides in part: '"Whoever violates this section
shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not
less than thirty nor more than ninety days, or both and shall pay not less than fifty
nor more than five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby ... 
61 165 Ohio St. at 156, 134 N.E.2d at 375.
62 Id. at 154, 134 N.E.2d at 374.
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In Tynes v. Gogos,63 a District of Columbia court was faced
with the question of whether a civil cause of action for damages
could be based upon the violation of a municipal ordinance. There,
the plaintiff, a white woman, and her husband, a Negro, were or-
dered to stop dancing in a restaurant and dance hall owned by the
defendant because mixed dancing was not permitted. The woman
sought damages because of the alleged violation of local antidis-
crimination laws, contending that the words and actions of the de-
fendant caused her to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anguish,
and anxiety. The court held that the ordinance was penal in char-
acter and did not give rise to a civil action for damages.6" In addi-
tion, the court stated that an ordinance cannot directly provide that
one person owes a civil duty to another which will serve as the basis
of an action in tort for the breach of that duty. It was asserted that
such a cause of action must arise either at common law or by a
statute in the jurisdiction.s
B. Liberal Construction of Statutes
The Fletcher and Tynes decisions support the conclusion that
statutory remedies are the exclusive forms of relief available to an
aggrieved party. However, the more liberal cases have found that,
first, by enacting a public accommodations law, the legislature has
expressed its intention to eliminate discrimination and, second, the
best remedy to effectuate this legislative intent should be granted.66
In order to insure that administrative enforcement by commissions
will effectuate the purposes of antidiscrimination laws, some legisla-
tures provide in express terms that the laws should be liberally con-
strued.6" Arguably, such language provides sufficient justification
for allowing laws against discrimination to support a civil action for
damages. An examination of some of the cases which have per-
mitted this type of action to be based upon a state public accom-
modations statute6" indicates that state statutory remedies do not
necessarily preclude a separate tort action.
63 144 A.2d 412 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
6Id. at 415.
65 Id. at 417.
66 See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947);
c. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).67 See, e.g., OnlO REV. CODE § 4112.08.
68 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Powell v. Utz, 87 F.
Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1949); Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341
P.2d 859 (1959); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813
(1921).
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In Browning v. Slenderella Systems,69 a Negro woman went to
the defendant's salon for a courtesy demonstration of Slenderella
reducing treatments. Although she had made an appointment by
telephone, the plaintiff was refused service because she was a Negro.
The plaintiff brought an action for damages for the embarrassment,
humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional shock of this act of dis-
crimination. The court held that a civil cause of action would
accrue in favor of a person who suffered discrimination in violation
of the public accommodations statute.7" The court, stating that al-
though the statute was penal in form, it was remedial in its nature
and effect, accorded the aggrieved party a civil remedy against
the violator. Damages were said not to be precluded merely be-
cause criminal sanctions alone were provided by the statute.71 This
case illustrates the broad construction a court can give to a public
accommodations statute.
In another Washington case, Anderson v. Pantages Theatre
Co.,7" the supreme court held that a mere refusal of service or of ad-
mittance to a public place based upon race or color is sufficient to
constitute a cause of action which lies in tort. There, a Negro was
refused admission to a theater after he had purchased tickets for a
performance. An action was brought against the theater company
for the humiliation, mental suffering, and injury to the plaintiff's
feelings. The court included mental suffering as an element of
actual damages7" and awarded plaintiff three hundred dollars. In
holding that the defendant's conduct constituted a tort, the court
relied upon an early Michigan case which stated that
where a statute imposes upon any person a specific duty for the
protection or benefit of others, if he neglects or refuses to perform
such duty, he is liable for any injury or detriment caused by such
neglect or refusal, if such injury is of the kind which the statute
was intended to prevent ....
A rationale similar to that in Anderson might also be employed
to allow a tort action for the violation of state antidiscrimination
laws which provide only administrative relief. Thus, an aggrieved
party would have a tort action against a person who discriminates
in employment, housing, or public accommodations.
69 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
70 WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.91.010 (1962).
7154 Wash. 2d at 445-46, 341 P.2d at 863.
72 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
73 Id. at 31, 194 Pac. at 816.
74 Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 365, 46 N.W. 718, 720 (1890).
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IV. EXTENSION OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN OTHER
AREAS OF LAW
A cause of action can be implied so as to extend a civil remedy
to one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation which
does not explicitly provide such relief. The doctrine of implied
remedies appears to have gained significant application, particularly
in federal regulatory statutes where the legislative remedy or ad-
ministrative agency could not afford adequate relief.75 The doctrine
has also been applied to impose civil liability for the violation of
criminal statutes.7"
Two theories have been advanced for implying a civil cause of
action from the violation of a statute. One view is that the statute
sets forth the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, the violation
of which is evidence of either prima facie negligence or negligence
per se.77 The other theory is that the statute declares certain behavior
to be wrongful and that the court can create a new cause of action
against the party guilty of such wrongful conduct.78 Under the
first theory, existing standards of conduct are changed by the statute;
under the latter theory, a new cause of action is created. The effect
under either theory is to impose liability where none existed before
the statute was enacted.
In dealing with cases where antidiscrimination laws have been
violated, the courts might adopt either one or both of these theories.
By permitting a violation of antidiscrimination laws to be evidence
of prima fade negligence, the courts could defeat any argument that
the statutory remedy is exclusive. The legislation, in effect, allows
an extension of existing tort law to provide a civil remedy to an
aggrieved party. On the other hand, if the courts adopt the theory
that a new cause of action is created from the statute itself, argu-
ments might be made that the court is performing a legislative
function.
75 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Neiswonger v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929); Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. North
Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). See Note, Implying Civil Remedies
From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963).
7 0 Discussions relevant to this problem include Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by
Criminal Legislation, 16 MINAN. L. REV. 361 (1932); Morris, The Role of Criminal
Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoLIlm. L. REV. 21 (1949); Note, The Use of Crimi-
nal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUm. L. RKv. 456 (1948); Note, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REV. 453 (1933).
77 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TORTS § § 285-88 (1965). See Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
7 8 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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A. Tort Liability for Violation of Criminal and Regulatory
Statutes
In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,79 a federal district court
followed the doctrine which permits treatment of a criminal or
regulatory statute as creating a cause of action in favor of members
of a class for whose protection the statute was enacted. Under this
theory, a tort action can be brought by anyone in the protected class
who is injured by a violation of the statute. In this case, a lawyer
holding a tourist reservation on a TWA flight was informed that
the airline had oversold the flight and that his accommodations had
been given to a first class passenger. The plaintiff lawyer brought
an action based upon section 404(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act8"
for compensatory and exemplary damages because of the defendant
airline's unjust discrimination. Though the act provides only in-
junctive and criminal sanctions, the court awarded the plaintiff one
dollar and fifty-four cents in compensatory damages and five thou-
sand dollars in exemplary damages.81 Actual damages being negli-
gible, the court awarded substantial punitive damages to afford
redress to the plaintiff because there was no administrative authority
in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to award damages or other
relief to a passenger for past wrongs.8" The court reasoned that the
deprivation of the passenger's contractual rights under the act
amounted to tortious conduct on the part of the airline and that
traditional judicial remedies generally available for tortious acts
should therefore be available to the injured party.8"
The doctrine of implying a civil remedy to permit a recovery of
damages for violation of a criminal or regulatory statute has been
adopted in a small number of cases involving unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or color. For example, in Fitzgerald v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,8" the court held that the Civil Aero-
nautics Act created a new federal right in favor of an aggrieved
Negro passenger. The CAB could issue prospective orders prohibit-
ing discrimination against airline passengers but could not award
79 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
80 72 Star. 760 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1964). The act provides in part:
".no air carrier... shall... subject any particular person... to any unjust discrinina-
tion or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
81 200 F. Supp. at 368.
82 Id. at 364.
83 Id. at 367.
84 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
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damages to the party discriminated against.8" For this reason, the
court found an implied private remedy for damages. A similar ra-
tionale has also been employed by a federal court to discover an
implied remedy where there has been a violation of a state public
accommodations statute.8" However, the doctrine has not had as
much success in discrimination cases litigated in state courts.
It has been shown that state statutory regulations do not provide
an aggrieved party with a civil remedy to recover compensatory
damages8  Yet, a person discriminated against is a member of a
class for whose protection antidiscrimination laws were enacted.
Where criminal and regulatory statutes have been enacted for the
protection of a certain class, courts have implied a civil remedy in
favor of members of the protected class. Therefore, it would seem
to be a sound policy for state courts to adopt the principle that un-
lawful discriminatory conduct is wrongful and should be considered
a tortious act. In Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub.
Serv. Co.,88 Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that "if civil liability is
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not
denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically author-
ized."" Certainly a civil remedy in favor of a party who has been
discriminated against would be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of antidiscrimination statutes.
B. Tort Liability in Relation to Labor Disputes
By virtue of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 0 the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulates activities and
settles disputes between unions and employers. The sole remedy
provided by the act for violations by either party is the relief afforded
by the NLRB. But the fact that a union or an employer has a
remedy to resolve certain labor disputes under the Taft-Hartley
Act"' does not necessarily "pre-empt" a tort action by the injured
party in a state court." In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon,8 the United States Supreme Court laid down the criteria
8 5Id. at 502.
8 6 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
8 7 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
88341 U.S. 246 (1951).
89 Id. at 261 (dissenting opinion).
9049 Stat 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
9161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
92 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (dictum).
93 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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by which a state court could exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought
by a union or employer. The Court held that a tort action in a
state court would be permitted: (1) when the activity regulated was
a merely peripheral concern of the NLRA, and (2) where the regu-
lated conduct was of strong state interest. 4
In 1959, subsequent to the Garmon decision, Congress amended
the Taft-Hartley Act95 to permit a state court to assert jurisdiction
over labor disputes in which the NLRB declines to assert jurisdic-
tion. This has served to broaden the number of cases in which a
civil remedy could be recognized in the state courts. For example,
in a recent case before the Supreme Court, the NLRA was held not
to bar the maintenance of a civil action for libel in a state court.96
The Court reasoned:
The injury that the statement might cause to an individual's
reputation... has no relevance to the Board's function.... The
Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other
relief to the defamed individual....
On the contrary, state remedies have been designed to com-
pensate the victim and enable him to vindicate his reputation.
The Board's lack of concern with the "personal" injury caused by
malicious libel, together with its inability to provide redress to the
maligned party, vitiates the ordinary arguments for pre-emption.97
Although the state tort action for labor disputes does not have
any direct relation to civil remedies for discrimination, it is some-
what analogous and may serve to reinforce the argument in favor of
a tort action in state courts for the violation of antidiscrimination
laws. The injuries which the aggrieved party suffers cannot be
fully redressed by the regulatory agencies, because the statutes con-
fer no power on the commissions to grant reparation in money dam-
ages for the past misconduct of the discriminating party. But in a
tort action the state courts would be able to compensate the dis-
criminated plaintiff, thus enabling him to recover his losses. The
commissions' inability to provide redress should vitiate any argu-
ment that the statutory remedies are exclusive.
C. Action for Treble Damages in Antitrust Cases
The field of antitrust law has also focused attention on the
civil remedy for damages. Any person who is injured in his busi-
94 Id. at 243-44.
95 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964). See § 1(b) (2)
of the NLRA, added by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 Stat. 541, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1964).
96 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
7 Id. at 63. (Footnote omitted.)
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ness or property by reason of a violation of the federal antitrust laws
may sue to recover damages or for injunctive relief." The private
antitrust suit, in addition to redressing the injured party and prevent-
ing loss or damage to the plaintiff's business, serves as a deterrent to
antitrust violations. This is especially true regarding the damage
action in which treble damages are recoverable. 9  Furthermore,
private suits contribute to the interpretation and understanding of
the federal antitrust laws and serve as an enforcement vehicle sup-
plementing the government antitrust action.1"'
Interestingly, the actual amount of damages need not be pre-
cisely established in all antitrust cases. In the absence of exact
proof, a jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the dam-
ages.' As long as the injuries can be attributed to the wrong
committed in violation of the antitrust laws, damages are recov-
erable.10 2
A similar treble damage action is provided for a violation of the
Michigan public accommodation statute, °3 but no other state has
adopted an action resembling the private antitrust suit. If such an
action were utilized to enforce antidiscrimination laws, its effect
would parallel the success it has had in enforcing the federal anti-
trust law. However, since the legislatures have not provided a
private suit for treble damages as a remedy for a violation of anti-
discrimination laws, a stronger case can be made for the courts to
recognize a civil remedy for damages. If the legislatures created
the right to be free from discrimination, they must have intended
that the statutory remedies should not preclude other effective reme-
dies which could protect that right and redress the injured party.
08 Private actions under the antitrust laws are authorized by sections 4 and 16 of
the Clayton Act, 38 Star. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1964).
99 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part: "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .. ." 38 Star.
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
'
0 0 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1964), the Clayton Act, 38 Star. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §S 14-27 (1964), and the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1964), contain both civil and criminal sanctions which are enforceable by the Anti-
trust Division of the United States Department of Justice.
1ol Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 332 U.S. 817 (1946); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
1o2 Pennington v. U!MW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
3.03 MC-. STAT. ANN. § 28.344 (1962).
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V. CONCLUSION
Recently enacted antidiscrinination laws have established a stan-
dard of conduct which makes discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, ancestry, or national origin a statutory violation. Until
now these laws have been enforced solely by administrative agen-
cies which have authority to issue prospective orders, thus leaving
the aggrieved party with no compensation for his injuries. Since
such legislation creates in a protected class of individuals a legal
right not to be discriminated against, anyone who violates an anti-
discrimination statute or ordinance acts in deliberate disregard of the
legal rights of another. It follows that a cause of action for the
commission of an intentional tort should lie in favor of the ag-
grieved party. Recognition by the courts that unlawful discrimina-
tion is an actibnable tort would provide a means of compensation
for the economic loss, humiliation, and mental anguish incurred
because of the violator's wrongful conduct.
GERALD B. MAGARO
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